Colloquium: The Strategic Constitution
Robert D. Cooter
The Founders of the United States understood that an effective constitution creates incentives that change the behavior of public officials and citizens. Economists and political scientists have used the tools of social science to study these effects. This colloquium will review their findings and take on the exciting challenge of relating them to constitutional law.
The primary reading is from the presenter’s book entitled The Strategic Constitution. It uses the best available theories from economics and political science to predict the consequences of different constitutional powers and rights. One insight is that the basic structure of American constitutional law makes sense from an economic perspective.
The four sections of the book cover the processes of democratic government (voting, bargaining and administering), the levels of government (federalism), the division of powers among the branches of the federal government and the rights of individuals.
Along the way, the colloquium will examine some basic ideas in the Public Choice literature that has revolutionized the study of constitutional governance and political science.
Robert D. Cooter is Herman F. Selvin Professor at Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, Berkeley. He is a former president of the American Law & Economics Association and a co-author of Law and Economics, a widely translated textbook.